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THE CHAMBER IN THE CHAMBERS:
THE MAKING OF A BIG-BUSINESS JUDICIAL
MONEY MACHINE
Alyssa Katz*
The Clifford Symposium has invited me not as a legal scholar, a
judge, or even an attorney, but as a journalist who specializes in inves-
tigating and analyzing systems of power, and in particular the intersec-
tion of government action and private activity.  This pursuit demands
researching the workings and impact of the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, an organization that over the last two decades has profoundly
reshaped the power dynamic between business and government in the
United States as a whole, including elected judiciaries.
This Article assesses what I call the Chamber of Commerce’s “judi-
cial climate change operation.”  The goal of this operation is to trans-
form the composition of state court benches by facilitating the
election of business-friendly judges.  This Article begins by explaining
the Chamber of Commerce’s history, organizational framework, and
strategy.  Then, importantly, the Article analyzes the identities and
objectives of the companies funding the Chamber of Commerce’s
work.
The Basics: What is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce?
The Chamber nominally represents millions of American businesses
big and small.  However, for all practical purposes, it is acting on be-
half of a core group of approximately 1,500 major companies that act
in near anonymity.1  The Chamber has forged its unique power
through aggressive fundraising and highly strategic deployment of its
resources, maneuvering multiple levers of power simultaneously, in all
three branches of government at the federal and state levels.
The Chamber, a 501(c)(6) tax-exempt trade organization, was
founded in 1912.  It is the biggest lobbyist in Washington, having spent
* Alyssa Katz is a member of the New York Daily News editorial board and the author of
The Influence Machine: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Corporate Capture of American
Life.
1. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE GILDED CHAMBER: DESPITE CLAIMS OF REPRESENTING MILLIONS
OF BUSINESSES, THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE GETS MOST OF ITS MONEY FROM JUST 64
DONORS 3 (2014).
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in excess of $1 billion on the services of top firms and its own sizeable
staff of lobbying personnel in the past two decades.2  It remains a
leader in the use of dark money to secure congressional seats for pro-
business Republicans.  The Chamber played a decisive role in securing
party control of the House in 2010 and the Senate in 2014 and was an
innovator of the now commonplace use of tax-exempt groups as
weapons of federal election warfare waged anonymously.3  It funds a
massive litigation operation, active in beating back labor, environmen-
tal, and consumer regulation as both a primary litigant and a prolific
filer of amicus briefs.
On top of all that, the Chamber funnels dark money into judicial
elections, and has broken spending records, arguably ushering in the
age of mega-money judicial races.  Albeit through a foggy window
since the identities of donors are rarely disclosed, the Chamber’s Insti-
tute for Legal Reform makes for an excellent case study in the organi-
zational mechanics and interest-group dynamics of political action.
The Institute for Legal Reform describes its mission on its website
as “[p]romot[ing] civil justice reform through legislative, political, ju-
dicial, and educational activities at both the national and local levels”
and to the Internal Revenue Service as “making America’s legal sys-
tem simpler, fairer and faster for everyone.”4  This is an overly hum-
ble and neutral way to describe an organization that spends billions of
dollars on lobbying and elections.  In 2014, the most recent year for
which its IRS filings are publicly available, the Institute for Legal Re-
form raised $45 million in revenue, on top of the $206 million brought
in by the Chamber of Commerce itself.  The Institute for Legal Re-
form spent one-third of this money on political campaigns with a sig-
nificant share of this amount going to judicial elections.
Like the Chamber of Commerce itself, the Institute for Legal Re-
form benefits from the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and most
state regulators’ indifference toward explicit political campaign activi-
ties by tax-exempt trade associations and social welfare groups.  This
2. Annual Lobbying by U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Oct. 21,
2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000019798 (collecting statistics de-
rived from U.S. Senate lobbying reports).
3. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and Why
Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16
NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 91 (2010–2011); Robert G. Boatright, Michael J. Malbin &
Brendan Glavin, Independent Expenditures in Congressional Primaries After Citizens United: Im-
plications for Interest Groups, Incumbents and Political Parties, 5 INT. GRPS. & ADVOC. 119
(2016).
4. INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, https://www.uschamber.com/institute-legal-reform (last
visited January 3, 2018); US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, I.R.S. Form 990 (2014).
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indifference has resulted in a lack of state or federal campaign laws
that might compel disclosure of the sources of corporate contributions
to such organizations when they engage in campaign-related activities.
So long as groups do not coordinate with campaigns and claim that
political activity is not their primary purpose, they face no obstacle to
political spending funded by anonymous sources, however aggressive
it may be.5
In 2014, the Institute for Legal Reform’s largest political expendi-
ture, $2.75 million,6 benefited a group called the Republican State
Leadership Committee (“RSLC”)—making the Chamber of Com-
merce the largest donor that year to a group that spent $3.4 million on
television ads, phone banks, and other voter-influence efforts con-
nected to judicial elections in North Carolina, Montana, Missouri,
Tennessee, and Illinois.7
As the Brennan Center has documented, one RSLC-funded ad at-
tacked North Carolina Supreme Court Judge Robin Hudson.  The ad
described her as a friend to child molesters citing her dissent to an
opinion that upheld the constitutionality of an offender satellite track-
ing system.  She won reelection despite the attack campaign.  One
may reasonably conclude she was targeted not because of her stance
on the balance between personal privacy and public safety, but be-
cause of her opinions favoring corporate liability.
Because the RSLC also spends millions to keep state legislatures
under party control and elect business-friendly attorneys general, it is
not possible to trace all this spending back to the Chamber of Com-
merce.  Nor is it possible to confirm the Chamber played a role in the
RSLC’s spending in a second race, in Illinois: the reelection of Lloyd
Karmeier, whose first campaign in 2004 was a watershed for dark
money in judicial elections.  But its past role in Karmeier’s election is
well documented.
In 2004, the Chamber of Commerce openly targeted a sitting ap-
peals court judge who was seeking retention, Gordon Maag, in a juris-
diction viewed as one of the most plaintiff-friendly in the country,
with the goal of securing a pro-business majority.  Maag was also run-
ning against Karmeier for an open seat on the Illinois Supreme Court.
5. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The His-
tory of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the Dark Money Election, 27
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2013).
6. US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, I.R.S. Form 990 (2014) (with help from research
done by Alicia Bannon and her colleagues at the Brennan Center for Justice).
7. SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–14, at 30–37 (2015).
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The Chamber’s forceful $2.3 million assault, in partnership with the
Illinois Chamber of Commerce, included lurid smear ads.  Voters de-
nied Maag retention on the appellate court; he also lost the Supreme
Court election to Karmeier.8
In doing so, the Chamber achieved two results of incredible value.
The Illinois Supreme Court had before it a $10.1 billion jury award
against defendant Philip Morris, in a class-action lawsuit alleging that
the company had deceptively marketed light cigarettes as a safer alter-
native to other tobacco products.9  The court was also about to con-
front a $1.05 billion judgment against State Farm, in a case concerning
corner-cutting on replacement auto parts.10  Soon after his election,
Karmeier cast the decisive vote relieving State Farm of its burden,11
and in the following year Karmeier was in the 4-2 majority that over-
turned the Philip Morris judgment.12
Just as important, the election victory signaled to prospective do-
nors that the Chamber of Commerce and its Institute for Legal Re-
form was a winning force well worth the investment.  Indeed, in 2004
the Institute for Legal Reform won twelve out of thirteen state high
court races where it ran attack ads.13  Not surprisingly, Chamber of
Commerce President and CEO Thomas J. Donohue has been known
to pitch that his group provides political “reinsurance” for major busi-
nesses, just as insurance companies seek to hedge against their own
risks.  The Chamber does not win every race; in fact, Karmeier barely
won retention in 2014.  But the steady trajectory has moved targeted
states away from judges perceived as friendly to plaintiffs and toward
candidates considered more pro-business.
What Businesses are Donating to the Chamber of Commerce?
This brings us to the $250 million question: What are these busi-
nesses?  How did they band together in this singularly active, strategic,
and longstanding vehicle with such effective results?  The search for
an answer takes us back two decades, to Donohue’s arrival at the
Chamber of Commerce in 1997 and his ambitious, wide-reaching ef-
8. CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, HIDDEN RIVERS: HOW TRADE ASSOCIATIONS CONCEAL
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING, ITS THREAT TO COMPANIES, AND WHAT SHAREHOLDERS
CAN DO 24–26 (2006); David B. Rottman and Roy A. Schotland, 2004 Judicial Elections, in
COUNS. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, 305, 307 (2015).
9. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005).
10. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
11. Id. at 834–35.
12. Price, 848 N.E.2d at 50–51.
13. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 1–12 (2004).
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forts to turn what had become an increasingly marginal, politically di-
vided, and largely ineffectual interest group into a political force with
the power to reliably sway outcomes in government.
Such an ambition required major funding from companies with a
stake in the outcome. In exchange, through the privacy granted to
trade associations, the Chamber of Commerce could provide anonym-
ity and political cover—doing the heavy political lifting that compa-
nies are uncomfortable doing for fear of alienating investors and the
public.
The trove of internal records made public through the 1990s to-
bacco industry legal settlements provides the clearest window we have
into how these transactions worked at the outset.  They also illustrate
the motives and movements of an industry highly incentivized to seek
out such a subterfuge.  The tobacco files include highly specific re-
search and lobbying instructions that accompanied donations to the
Chamber of Commerce.  The instructions detailed how to effectively
lobby and conduct public opinion polling in order to attack the to-
bacco industry litigation mounted by President Clinton’s Department
of Justice.14
The Chamber filed the sole amicus brief in 1999 when Philip Morris,
fighting the landmark Engle lawsuit with potentially billions of dollars
in judgments on the line, sought Supreme Court review of a motion to
disqualify Florida trial judge Robert P. Kaye.15  The Chamber brief
argued that Judge Kaye had been a smoker and suffered from heart
disease, the linkage between which formed a central issue in the case,
and therefore he could not fairly preside over the trial.16  The Su-
preme Court, while accepting the brief from the National Chamber
Litigation Center, declined to hear the case.17  The Engle litigation
ultimately generated a $144 billion jury verdict, which was voided by
14. See TRUTH TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS, https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.
edu/tobacco/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
15. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Philip Morris Inc. v. Engle, 529 U.S. 1144 (2000) (No. 99-1277), 2000 WL 34014091. See
also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
class certification for all Florida citizens and residents who suffer harm as a result of addiction to
cigarettes containing nicotine); Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Liti-
gation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 73
(1997).
16. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Philip Morris Inc. v. Engle, 529 U.S. 1144 (2000) (No. 99-1277), 2000 WL 34014091.
17. Philip Morris Inc. v. Engle, 529 U.S. 1144 (2000).
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the Florida Supreme Court six years later.  However, its progeny has
nonetheless generated hundreds of millions of dollars in verdicts.18
The Chamber’s brief foreshadowed the aggressiveness with which
its Institute for Legal Reform would seek to remove judges from the
bench who presided over costly verdicts.  When it began in 1998, the
Institute operated as little more than a think tank.  It issued papers
and press releases complaining about jury awards under a board with
plenty of prestige, including former attorneys general Edwin Meese
and Richard Thornburgh, but was light on action.  It functioned in
effect as a successor organization to a 501(c)(3) nonprofit called Citi-
zens for a Sound Economy.  This nonprofit was funded by Koch In-
dustries, Philip Morris, and Bernie Marcus, among others, and had
devoted itself to advancing a bill in Congress that would have dramati-
cally limited punitive damages in lawsuits.
Marcus, the founder of Home Depot, provided early backing for
the Chamber of Commerce and its Institute for Legal Reform.  The
Chamber, in contrast to Citizens for a Sound Economy, was a
501(c)(6) trade association and therefore was free to spend funds on
lobbying and political activities on a significant scale.  Marcus brought
with him Steven Hantler, who had defended Chrysler Motors in prod-
uct liability cases, to chair a steering committee that would lead to the
establishment of the Institute for Legal Reform.  Hantler takes credit
for guiding the Chamber leadership toward the ultimate goal of trans-
forming the state judiciary and the culture of juries to guard against
mega-verdicts.19  He also saw fundraising as an antidote to the power
and funds amassed by the plaintiffs’ bar in many state elections.
The funders and steering committee leading the Institute for Legal
Reform rapidly evolved the group into a well-tuned and well-funded
arsenal for campaign combat, aimed at judicial elections.  Director
Jim Wootton, a Reagan and Bush Justice Department veteran, ex-
plained: “You could sort of show the corporate leadership that you
could reach parity with the plaintiffs’ trial bar in these judicial races,
that there would be an appetite for engaging in those races, with
enough resources to be competitive.”20  In other words, the Institute
for Legal Reform sought critical mass and recognized early on that the
sheer scale of the spending and the power to tip the balance of the
18. What is the “Engel Progeny” Litigation?, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM (June
2015), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-engle-progeny-
2015.pdf.
19. Telephone Interview with Steven Hantler, Director of Policy Initiatives, Marcus Family
Office (Feb. 19, 2013).
20. Telephone Interview with Jim Wootton, Chairman and CEO, Partnership for America
(Oct. 1, 2012).
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bench, not just in one state but in multiple jurisdictions, would be cru-
cial to the enterprise.
The Institute for Legal Reform aimed to intimidate through sheer
volume of cash.  As expressed in an email sent from an operative on
the front lines of a successful effort to sideline a pro-consumer attor-
ney general candidate, sent to a Chamber political fundraiser: “Need
your help reinforcing that being this aggressive and going after bullies
like her is what makes us a player and is recognized and what gets us
respect.”21
To concentrate its financial firepower, the enterprise chose its con-
tests carefully.  Accordingly, leading Institute for Legal Reform busi-
nesses held regular conference calls to choose priority (“Tier 1”)
targets.  The opportunity in Illinois in 2004 to block Gordon Maag and
install Lloyd Karmeier was Tier 1.  Then CEO of State Farm, Ed Rust
Jr., was part of the committee that chose priority targets.22  Recall, in
2004 State Farm had hundreds of millions of dollars on the line in a
case that was being litigated in Illinois.
The question of who else donated to fund the 2004 campaign of
Karmeier continues to have powerful repercussions years later.  In
2015, Judge Karmeier refused to recuse himself from an appeal in the
$10 billion tobacco case, arguing there was no evidence that the to-
bacco companies had backed his 2004 campaign.23  He then, again,
was part of a 4-2 majority that refused to reinstate the judgment.
However, we do know some of the institute’s early sponsors in pre-
vious races.  In 2001, a rare leak of an internal record revealed several
of the stakeholders backing the overall endeavor.  They included play-
ers from the auto industry—GM, Toyota, and Ford—that were on the
defensive against product liability suits.24  Also sponsoring the Insti-
tute for Legal Reform were Walmart and FedEx, as well as insurers
State Farm and AIG.25
AIG CEO Hank Greenberg was so keen on what the Institute was
doing that he devoted $24 million in grants from his Starr Foundation
21. Email from Rob Engstrom, Dir. of Political Affairs, Institute for Legal Reform, to Scott
Reed, American Taxpayers Alliance (September 13, 2004) (on file with author).
22. Deposition of Rob Engstrom in Voters Educ. Comm. v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure
Comm’n, Super. Ct. of Washington for King County, 04-2-23511-1.
23. Order Denying Motion for Recusal or Disqualification at 8–10, Philip Morris USA v. Ap-
pellate Court, No. 117689 (Ill. Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/supremecourt/
specialmatters/2014/102114_117689_Order.pdf (“In reality, the notion that movant was responsi-
ble for financing my run for office ten years ago is just that, a notion. It is based entirely on
conjecture, innuendo and speculation[.]”).
24. James VandeHei, Political Cover: Major Business Lobby Wins Back Its Clout by Dispens-
ing Favors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A1.
25. Id.
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to the Chamber’s charitable foundation.  This was promptly followed
by loans on a similar scale from the foundation to the Chamber itself.
Ostensibly for its capital campaign, but fungible in practice, this loan
freed funds for other Chamber of Commerce expenditures, including
political campaigns.  Across disparate industries and diverse priorities,
these corporate giants through the Institute for Legal Reform found
common ground in creating an environment in state courts hostile to
product-liability plaintiffs, making them less vulnerable to verdicts.
Having amassed the funds, the Institute for Legal Reform set out to
spend them.  In Ohio, in 2000, the Institute with the U.S. Chamber
targeted Justice Alice Robie Resnick hoping to decrease the likeli-
hood of her reelection.26  She had written the 4-3 decision that struck
down as unconstitutional a law that capped punitive damages at as
little as $250,000 and economic damages at $500,000.  Her opinion
willfully crossed lines earlier drawn by the court.27  Wrote Justice Res-
nick: “[T]he very notion of it threatens the judiciary as an indepen-
dent branch of government and tears at the fabric of our
Constitution.”28  This was not the first time she was part of a majority
that struck down Ohio legislation constraining plaintiffs in tort
actions.29
The bid to block Resnick’s reelection brought the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce into a strategic alliance with an affiliated state entity, the
Ohio Chamber of Commerce.30  Along with U.S. Chamber and Insti-
tute for Legal Reform, the Ohio Chamber and an affiliated group
called Citizens for a Strong Ohio spent an extraordinary sum to influ-
ence the outcome of Resnick’s reelection—more than $5 million in
all.31  In a harbinger of the present political moment, one ad pushed
blatantly false information, suggesting that payoffs caused Justice Res-
nick to switch sides in a ruling.  In fact, though Resnick did vote to
grant a rehearing to the plaintiffs, she sided with the corporate defen-
dant in that case.32  The Chamber was so hard-pressed to find ad fod-
26. HIDDEN RIVERS, supra note 9, at 15–19.
27. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999).
28. Id. at 1087.
29. See, e.g., Brady v. Safety-Kleem Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
30. “Chamber’s ad effort failed in Ohio, worked in other states,” Associated Press, Nov. 9,
2000.
31. HIDDEN RIVERS, supra note 9, at 15; High Court Unchanged Despite Negative TV Ads,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at 1A; JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDI-
CIAL ELECTION 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE 5 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf.
32. Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 575 N.E.2d 134
(Ohio 1991), reh’g granted, 578 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio 1991), reh’g vacated, 582 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio
1991).
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der it resorted to fabrication.  Regarding a separate misstatement of
fact in the advertising campaign that Justice Resnick ruled in favor of
trial lawyers who contributed to her campaign nearly 70% of the
time, the Ohio Elections Commission found the assertion in violation
of an Ohio statute prohibiting false statements in election materials
and issued a reprimand to Citizens for a Strong Ohio.33
Because litigation by the Ohio Board of Elections forced disclosure
of the donors behind Citizens for a Strong Ohio we know their identi-
ties—a rarity in such races.34  The Chamber, at $200,000, contributed
the most.  Other contributors included Procter & Gamble, AT&T,
Ford, Enron, Honda, Whirlpool, DaimlerChrysler, Exxon, and Philip
Morris.35
Justice Robie survived the assault by a healthy margin, but was an
exception in 2000.  That year, the Chamber spent around $7 million on
fifteen judicial and attorney general candidates.36  Twelve won.  The
model worked as predicted.
Ohio was not the only state to seek donor disclosure that year—
Mississippi’s Democratic Attorney General Mike Moore did as well.
He also successfully moved to block the Chamber’s ads as political
advertising falsely posing as educational in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.37  However, the Cham-
ber, on the eve of the election, obtained an order from U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia that allowed the ads to run.38
The battle between the Chamber and the states over the Chamber’s
duty to disclose its donors continued for two years.  Ultimately, the
Fifth Circuit sided with the Chamber and the Supreme Court denied
the petition for review.39  We see here how the multiple parts of the
Chamber’s machinery work together: its litigation division stepped in
33. Kara Baker, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio Judicial Elections and
Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35 AKRON L.
REV. 159, 162–68 (2002).
34. Ohio Elections Comm’n v. Ohio Chamber of Commerce & Citizens for a Strong Ohio, 817
N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
35. Jim Tarbell, Business Buyout: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Rolls Over State Supreme
Courts, 4 JUSTICE RISING: GRASSROOTS SOLUTIONS TO CORPORATE DOMINATION, no. 4, Spring
2010, at 4.
36. Telephone Interview with Jim Wootton, Chairman and CEO, Partnership for America
(Oct. 1, 2012).
37. Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 191 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751–52 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (describ-
ing such advertisements).
38. Press Release, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Chamber Wins Free Speech
Case (Nov. 5, 2000), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/chamber-wins-free-speech-
case.
39. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Moore v. Chamber of Commerce, 537 U.S. 1018 (2002)
(No. 02-305).
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to do clean-up work for its judicial political operation.  Not only did
the litigation address the immediate threat of exposure of the Cham-
ber’s donors on the Mississippi project, it also ultimately inoculated
the Chamber against other states that might contemplate demanding
contributor exposure through their campaign finance regimes.
It would appear that the Chamber and its donors were not satisfied
even with this measure of security against disclosure.  Accordingly,
the Chamber and Institute for Legal Reform began to funnel judicial
election funds through yet another subterfuge.  The Institute funneled
millions of dollars in 2002 through two outside groups that we know
of, the NRA-associated Law Enforcement Alliance of America and
the American Taxpayers Alliance.40  The Law Enforcement Alliance
was the channel through which the Chamber removed Justice Chuck
McRae in Mississippi.
The gun industry had been scrambling at the time as cities such as
Chicago and Miami sued firearms manufacturers for compensation for
the grievous harms their products caused.41  The industry believed
McRae had to be sidelined because he was expected to vote against
legislation blocking all such firearms suits in Mississippi.  The gun
lobby was attempting to push comparable legislation through in nu-
merous states.  Ultimately, starting in 2005 federal law barred all such
lawsuits, except in circumstances so narrow that even the family mem-
bers of the Sandy Hook massacre victims have not been able to
prevail.42
The Chamber of Commerce openly marketed itself to litigation-
prone industries as a secret haven for money that the industries
wanted to be spent aggressively on judicial campaigns and litigation.
And, with proof of concept secured in 2000, the Chamber had proven
itself a successful vehicle for removing judges from the bench.
Conclusion
That basic funding and deployment model endures, with the Cham-
ber, the Institute for Legal Reform or, more often, third-party organi-
40. Taylor Lincoln, The New Stealth PACs: Tracking 501(c) Non-Profit Groups Active in Elec-
tions, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Sept. 2004); Issue Ads: Judge Refuses to Halt Ban; Attorneys to Decide
Whether They’ll Appeal, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, Oct. 27, 2001.  Scott Reed, director of the
American Taxpayers Alliance, eventually took over the Chamber’s election operation and ran it
until the end of 2016.
41. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15,
2000); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-01941 CA 06, 1999 WL 809838 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
1999).
42. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012)).
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zations handling the mechanics of media buys, robocalls, and other
armaments of political warfare.
Even where state legislatures and election officials demand infor-
mation on the sources of corporate funds for independent expenditure
committees, it is not uncommon for contributions to committees to
come from groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that do
not disclose their donors.  This allows the source of contributions to
remain masked even in a jurisdiction that nominally demands disclo-
sure.43  One potentially significant development since the 2000, 2002,
and 2004 election cycles is the increasing number of firms disclosing
their contributions to candidates and/or trade associations, such as the
Chamber of Commerce, that expend funds to influence the outcomes
of elections—although disclosure is still entirely voluntary and diffi-
cult to research.44
Millions of Americans have signed a petition to the Securities and
Exchange Commission to force disclosure of political spending.45  Un-
fortunately, the petition and public comments effectuated little change
within the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Nonetheless, institu-
tional investors, notably state and union pension funds and their care-
takers, have waged a useful campaign to promote corporate disclosure
of political activities, reaching agreements with numerous companies.
For the first time since the list leaked in 2001, we know at least
some of the sources of the Institute for Legal Reform’s funds—much
of that spending is earmarked as non-tax-deductible political or lobby-
ing contributions.  Among contributors that have publicly disclosed
spending are Prudential, MetLife, Anthem, Hartford and the Property
Casualty Insurers Association of America.46
However, the limitations of voluntary disclosure are self-evident.
Voluntary corporate disclosure of political contributions to organiza-
43. See, e.g., Voters Educ. Comm. v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 166 P.3d
1174 (Wash. 2007).
44. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spend-
ing, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 945–46 (2013).
45. Petition to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate
Resources for Political Activities, SEC File No. 4-637 (proposed Aug. 3, 2011).
46. See, e.g., Prudential, 2016 Political Activities and Contributions Report, http://corporate.
prudential.com/media/managed/public/PAC_Annual_Report_2016.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2018);
MetLife, Inc., MetLife, Inc. Political Activity, https://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/chairman/gov
ernance/conduct/2016-political-activities-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2018); Anthem, Political
Contributions & Related Activity Report, https://www.antheminc.com/cs/groups/wellpoint/@wp_
about_government/documents/wlp_assets/d19n/mza1/~edisp/pw_g305374.pdf; The Hartford, Po-
litical Activities & Contributions, https://ir.thehartford.com/~/media/Files/T/Thehartford-IR/docu
ments/annual-reports-and-proxy-statements/2016-annual-report-political-activities-and-contribu
tions.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
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tions as presently practiced has been limited to detailing dollars a
company provided generally.  That holds true even where a firm may
have provided a portion of those funds for purposes of a specific cate-
gory of election-related activity or even to influence the outcome of a
specific contest.
But the voluntary disclosure phenomenon nonetheless has a poten-
tial chilling effect, both on the contributions themselves and on the
aggressiveness of the actions carried out by the Institute for Legal Re-
form and its partners.  Importantly, as much as companies seek to pro-
tect against big jury awards, they must worry equally about their
liability in the court of public opinion.  Bringing dark money into the
light begins to make the spending warfare waged to win judicial elec-
tions a fair fight.
The institutional investors that have led the way to voluntary public
disclosure of corporate political contributions by introducing or
threatening shareholder resolutions demanding disclosure have incipi-
ent power to accomplish still more. With the aid of social media activ-
ism, these investors and allies—among them environmental,
consumer, and other groups seeking greater corporate accountabil-
ity—are poised to further alter the political climate in favor of disclo-
sure and by so doing, diminish outside spending on judicial races by
diminishing the benefits to be gained and making the reputational
costs of such spending too much for companies to bear.  Indeed, in
comments submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission op-
posing the petition for mandatory disclosure of political spending by
firms, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued that such disclosure
“would be used to attack the company and damage its brand, and
thereby hurt shareholder value.”47
Already, shareholder and ally activism has begun to educate the
public to perceive secretly funded intermediary organizations like the
Chamber of Commerce as a taint, both on candidates they spend to
install in office and on companies revealed to be contributors to those
groups.  If the shareholder activists fulfill the potential of the move-
ment they have started, it will be the companies that come clean.
They will provide a full and explicit accounting of their political
spending that includes every candidate their funds supported or op-
posed.  By doing so, these companies will win consumers’ loyalty and
dollars, the contest that matters most to their bottom lines.  For the
sake of their shareholders’ value, those companies will do well to stay
47. Twenty-Nine Undersigned Organizations, Comment Letter on Petition for Rulemaking to
Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for
Political Activities (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-1198.pdf.
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far away from the damaging reputational risks of publicized involve-
ment in judicial races, and leave the contests where they belong, in the
hands of the voters.
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